

# REVIEWS

**An Army at Dawn** by Rick Atkinson, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 681 pp., \$30.00.

Although early, it is not too early to declare Rick Atkinson the finest military historian of the 21st century. His new history of America at war in North Africa during 1942–1943 is the first of *The Liberation Trilogy*, with books to follow on Italy and Western Europe over the next 6 years.

Students and readers of military history are accustomed to authors who get the history right without the emotional content, or those who focus on the human face of war without following the flow of a campaign. Atkinson's art is to weave the emotional stress of war into the historical flow of battle. The reader gains the history, but with a deep sense of the human drama and all of its ambivalence. Atkinson has mastered the use of nuance, phrase, and prophetic suggestion in a style that is both poetic and emotional. You will laugh and cry when reading this book! He weaves the tales of countless soldiers — heroes and cowards — with a withering insight into their commanders. Whether praising or skewering these leaders, the diaries, letters, and reports of the soldiers have been exhaustively mined and woven into a tapestry that enfolds the reader with a vivid realism that sets a new standard for military history.

Worthy of praise are Atkinson's maps, which are both timely and useful. They are clear and concise and afford the reader a clarity that most historians and biographers fail to provide.

Beginning in the United States during 1942 with the planning for *Operation Torch*, Atkinson deftly portrays President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, and the principal Army and Navy commanders, Major General George S. Patton Jr. and Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt. His portraits of these men are highlighted by small details either unknown or previously ignored. Hewitt had commanded the *U.S.S. Indianapolis* in 1936 when President Roosevelt had spent a month aboard on a South American trip. So it is the wealthy, urbane, connected Patton who is left agog when the quiet Admiral introduces Patton to his commander in chief for the very first time. Details like this abound and are used by Atkinson in a prophetic way as he leads the reader to a fuller understanding of the complexities and relationships that turn future moments of history.

In his first meeting with the President, Patton in his inimitable way declares, "I will leave the beaches a conqueror or a corpse." It is no surprise that four and a half months later, the President notes in his diary that Patton, while escorting the President at Casablanca, tells him "at least five times that he hoped to die with his boots on." These threads abound in the book and reflect Atkinson's writing at its best.

For the inept or incapable, Atkinson's razor-edged sword is deft and frequent. Lieutenant

General Lloyd Fredendall is served up to the reader repeatedly in the middle portion of the book for his weak command and lack of personal courage. Having directed the dispersal of his American battalions among multiple Allied commands while savoring the taste of battle 200 miles from the fighting, Fredendall expends his engineer resources burrowing twin caves into a mountain for his II Corps headquarters. Atkinson savages Fredendall for issuing orders directly to his battalions while ignoring his division commanders and then fretting in an alcoholic stupor. Fredendall repairs to a Vichy mansion when the debacle at Kasserine Pass brings the fighting to within 100 miles of his cave. The 1st Infantry Division's mud-spattered artillery chief, Brigadier General Clift Andrus must await Fredendall's orders until served, "Dinner! Tablecloths, silver, waiters in white, beef — even ice cream." Sensing the personal consequences of the disaster, Fredendall cables Eisenhower to disparage Major General Orlando "Pinky" Ward, the 1st Armored Division commander, and try to make him the scapegoat.

General Andrus, a name forgotten by history, gains high praise from Atkinson for his superb artillery skills. Major General Terry Allen, one of the few fighters in senior command at this stage of the war, called his artillery chief, known as Mr. Chips, "The most skilled and practical artillery officer I know." Atkinson sees the artillery skills of Andrus as the crucial element that holds Rommel at Kasserine. What seals this German victory as the high water mark for the Axis in North Africa is another artilleryman, Brigadier General Stafford Le Roy Irwin, the 9th Infantry Division's artillery commander, who was "a skilled watercolorist who loved poetry almost as much as he loved massing fires." The reader comes away with a sense of the moment as well as a fresh appreciation for leaders vital to the success of America's fledgling Army and warmed with the glow of insight into their personality and character.

Reading this campaign afresh, the reader is left in wonder at the insecurity and weakness of the Allied commander, Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, during the first half of the campaign. Yet, just as the American forces began to find the mettle to weather the brutality of modern war after Kasserine, so too does Eisenhower ripen into the leader our memories crave to recall. Atkinson leads you to these inflection points of history where the course of events are changed, always carefully highlighting them with personal and provocative vignettes of the soldiers and their commanders. These details are so intimately woven into events that at first reading, it is easy to question the author's knowledge of such details. What is so professionally satisfying is to check his sources and never find him wanting.

What we want is more of Rick Atkinson's *Liberation Trilogy*. Waiting three years for his treatment of the campaign in Italy will require patience, but a periodic rereading of *An Army at*

*Dawn* will at least make the wait worthwhile and help pass the time.

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**SHARP CORNERS: Urban Operations at the Century's End**, by Dr. Roger J. Spiller, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000, 146 pp., available online at [www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/](http://www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/).

I am proud to have been Roger Spiller's student while at Fort Leavenworth. That said, this is the most insightful 21st-century book on warfare that I have read. This book must occupy a place on a professional soldier's bookshelf. It must be read, reread, dog-eared, written in, discussed, and thought on.

The introduction is packed with concise prose. Spiller outlines his purpose to articulate where urban conflict will fit into the operational art, modestly writing, "it is hoped... this study will contribute." It most certainly does just that. Spiller previews his work tongue-in-cheek, "Like Gaul, the study is made of three parts."

The first part of the study develops the theme that to take apart a city one must know how cities are constructed in the larger sense. There is the ground-level city of streets and boulevards, and offices and homes. There is the subterranean city of sewers, subways, and tunnels. There is the above-ground-level city of skyscrapers, high-rises, and towers. Finally, there is the cyber city — that region of the ether where wireless local area networks dominate. How the entity that is a city came to be is a part of this section. The reader gets a glimpse of urban design, city management, public transportation management, and those means by which a city gains its fuel, power, food, and information. Knowing how a city is made and built, one can begin to get an idea of how to disrupt the pattern of activity in a city, and how to use the city to an attacker's advantage. The first section then sets the stage for the rest of the work. The first section ends with Spiller writing, "Looking backward, we can see that modern war began turning slowly toward urban operations again during the Second World War and that this trend has gained momentum ever since."

The second part of the study puts urban conflict into a historical perspective. In one chapter, Spiller distills the experience of other armies into a concise historical review of combat in cities. His section titles give a clue of the content and context of his work, such as "The Nature and Conduct of the Siege," "The Question of Asymmetry," and "The Invisible City." Spiller writes that cities bring out the worst in armies, and that armies bring out the worst in cities. Historically, the city that lay in the path of an advancing army had few options: capitulation before siege; resist long

enough to satisfy the dictates of honor; resist to avoid losing and hope the army will lose its will; and finally, resist to the bitter end. Besieging armies had three options on conclusion of a siege: put the entire city to the sword; treat the defeated surviving defenders honorably, as well as their families; and sell the survivors into slavery and relocate the remaining population while razing the town. Spiller illustrates these points with examples from *Thucydides to the Romans*.

In the final two sections of the second part, "The Question of Asymmetry" and "The Invisible City," Spiller sets the stage for the real essence of his work, an effort to identify the role of cities in future U.S. military operations. He correctly points out that cities can be taken two ways — internally and externally. He also correctly points out that asymmetry's career as a modern concept is indicative of the theoretical void in operational thought. Asymmetry is the quest for advantage of one's opponents, which is a timeless part of military history. Warfare and war are not, and never should be, a fair fight. Spiller hammers home the point that asymmetry is "an incompletely thought-out notion [that] degenerates rapidly to slogan." The association of asymmetry and urban warfare then is indicative of not enough serious thought on the role of urban combat in our future operations and doctrine. What are the implications of the city on future operational, theory, doctrine, and, most importantly, practice? Spiller outlines a path toward answers in his third part.

It is impossible to succinctly restate the concepts Spiller puts forth in the third section of his book. For me, it was the most heavily underlined, highlighted, and scribbled margin thoughts. The world is urbanizing and globalizing. Information travels at light speed. He offers what I will refer to as Spiller's maxim of soldiering in the cybernetic era of the 21st century, "*That which can be controlled, will be controlled.*" All of us should remember what White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said during a press conference on the first day of Operation Just Cause. When a reporter asked who had operational control, Fitzwater replied that operational control was in the Pentagon. We have the means of long-range command and control. We have repeatedly said in our own discussions that the seeing eye of the media's tactical actions can have immediate strategic impact. Can we balance that reality with our own theory of war? Spiller thinks we cannot, yet.

We must, before it's too late, begin to seriously think through the operational art required for successful warfare in the 21st century. To say that cities will be a part of any future campaign is not enough, because we do not seriously study cities in our doctrine, tactics, or practice. Spiller clearly outlines a path forward into this doctrinal void in the third part of his book. He explains that our doctrinal concepts are useful if we want to refight the Civil War, but are rapidly losing relevance in this century, and we do not have replacements for decisive and culmination points. What is the

continuing utility of the center of gravity? Spiller maintains that a center of gravity must be discovered, not designated. He also calls for us to seriously consider the positive effects offered by friction to the army that learns to control it. "The larger the city we face," Spiller writes, "the more friction can be used as an offensive tool in disrupting the city's rhythm, and as a means of extending our control over it — control being the real key to empowering an urban campaign."

Spiller also points out that military theory represents the best distilled thought at the time, and the time is now to start thinking about how we will fight in cities to our own advantage. We cannot afford to disregard this area or wish away the problem. We will not always have proxies to fight for us, augmented by Special Operations Forces with laser designators. Information operations, media relations, and humanitarian concerns will all be within the scope of the future campaign planner, as well as dealing with the information tools that will allow the Pentagon and the White House to increasingly exercise control over tactical formations and decisions — the president really might have to know about a squad action in the information age.

I am going back to the field and taking this book with me. When reviewing a book, the highest praise I offer is that it made me think. Spiller's book made me think, and I did not enjoy the conclusions I came to, but I will continue to think. We cannot know in advance what our future wars will look like, we can know with certainty that we cannot fail our Republic. Get this book, study this book, think, think, and think again. The use of force cannot preclude the use of intellect; indeed, in our age, the use of force *demands* the use of intellect.

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**Misguided Weapons – Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield** by Azriel Lorber, Brassey's Inc., Dulles, VA, 2002, 293 pp., \$26.95 (hardback).

"The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them." — Charles Ardant du Picq (1870). Many books encourage the reader to question the writer's thought process. It is the rare book that inspires the reader to question his own. Dr. Azriel Lorber's *Misguided Weapons* is this kind of book. Recent *ARMOR* magazine discussions have been centered on different approaches to warfare — attrition, maneuver, or something else. Often overlooked in these debates are the technological changes in weaponry and equipment used by these differing approaches. Lorber argues that the proper understanding of technology may, in fact, be more critical than the tactics used.

Lorber is a retired Israeli officer and aerospace engineer. He has explored the impact of technological changes on warfare from the

Middle Ages through the Persian Gulf War. More importantly, he investigates how the failure to comprehend technological change has led to either defeat or a higher cost of victory. Additionally, he analyzes why these changes were missed despite readily known evidence of their existence.

The author sites the Battle of Crecy as an early example of failing to understand technological change. Despite having knowledge of and suffering defeat at the hands of the English soldier's longbow, the French knights charged headlong into the volley firing the longbow and were massacred. In fact, this lesson was ignored repeatedly and the French lost again at Poitiers and at Agincourt.

Other historical examples include the refusal to adopt the Gatling gun during the Civil War, the German's radar detection shortcomings during World War II, the American's failure to adopt the 17-pound British gun for the Sherman tank, and the Israeli's ignorance of the effectiveness of antitank guided missiles during the 1973 October War. The examples cited are not limited to those of past history; the book also discusses more recent deficiencies such as those of the Patriot missile against Iraqi modified scuds.

More than just listing these historical failures, Lorber probes into the psychological reasons why individuals are unable or unwilling to adapt to changing technology. Some of these reasons include preconceived ideas, overconfidence, political meddling, and the not-invented-here attitude. When looking at the psychological failures of others, a reader is forced to look within and wonder what changes he is missing today due to similar preconceptions.

I highly recommend this book to all military personnel and the politicians who have influence over military development. By the end of the book, the reader's well-thought-out positions may be subject to question. This tome is not only thought provoking and interesting, but it is well written. It is a welcome addition to any military professional's library.

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**The Two O' Clock: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift that Saved Israel** by Walter J. Boyne, St. Martin's Press, New York, 334 pp., 2002.

Retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Walter Boyne, served as the Director of the National Air and Space Museum from 1983 and 1986. He is the author of several books, including *Weapons of the Gulf War*. His latest book should be of interest to those involved in mechanized infantry and armor tactics for it gives a day by day detailed account of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Its focus is on the impact the United States airlift had on the course of the battle and takes readers from armor engagements in the Sinai and Golan Heights back to the flight line at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv.

The author vividly describes how the Egyptians employed the use of the Sagger anti-

tank missile and the RPG to counter Israeli armor. After massive losses, the Israelis improvised tactics in which armored personnel carriers, known as Zeldas in Israeli lingo, to close in on Egyptian infantry laying down concentrated machine gun fire. Boyne also discusses how the Israeli focus on tanks without an investment in artillery and APCs caused problems on the battlefield. The first 3 days on the northern front saw Syrian T-62s and T-55s attack Israel in three prongs in which wave upon wave of armor went against Israeli defenses. To the surprise of the Israelis, Syrian armor units had mastered night-time operations, using night vision equipment that hampered the qualitative edge of Israeli antitank units. Israelis were so desperate for equipment that they cobbled together a tank made up of captured T-54 and T-55 tanks mounted with a 105mm gun with an added U.S. engine and redesignated T-67S and sent them to reinforce the line.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War heavily influenced the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces and this book should be of interest to readers of *ARMOR* Magazine.

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**The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost** by The Russian General Staff, translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress. University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, KS, 2002, 364 pp., \$17.95.

*The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost* is an analysis of the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan from a Russian point of view. Compiled by the Russian General Staff on the Soviet Military experiences in Afghanistan, it is an after-action review put together by several Russian military authors covering what went right and what went wrong. As one would expect, this book includes a history of the conflict, a Soviet order of battle, and the Soviet Union's perception of Afghan organization and capabilities. The authors cover Soviet operational art, as well as how the war was waged by the different branches of service, including combat arms, combat support, and combat service support.

Mr. Grau adds his editorial insight at the end of each chapter or section of the book, providing additional context or facts overlooked or left out by the Soviet study. Numerous endnotes assist the reader in understanding Soviet military terms, and provide more background on certain topics. Several hand-drawn maps are included to help visualize the tactical vignettes. For the reader who is not familiar with Soviet map symbols, there is a key in the back of the book.

As a reference, one must keep in mind that this is a translation of a Russian work. There

are inaccuracies based on the Russian authors' research and their methods of trying to explain different events, occurrences, or organizations. As an example, the Soviets seem to be off the mark on how they believed the Mujahideen to be organized. Mr. Grau explains this was an effect of the Russian's Marxist Leninist doctrine causing them to see organization where there was perhaps little or none. The Russians believed that the Afghans were divided into seven brigades with a clear military chain of command. In actuality, these groups were much less organized than the Soviets gave them credit for, which caused to Soviets to plan to fight an enemy that was not there.

Since the work is a translation of a Russian study, it is at times difficult to read. Russian terminology sometimes does not translate well and the reader must understand the usage of certain direct translations from Russian. The book is full of factual information backed up by tactical vignettes. Unlike Grau's other works, *The Bear Went Over The Mountain* and *The Other Side Of The Mountain*, where vignettes are the primary focus of the books, the vignettes in *The Soviet-Afghan War* are added to illustrate a particular point. This causes the book to read like a field manual at times, very full of facts and difficult to digest on the first take.

As a Russian foreign area officer, this book is useful to me, but I would not recommend this book to Armor leaders who do not have a specific interest in Soviet military history. This book is not a how-to manual for mechanized operations in Afghanistan. It is a detailed analysis of how the Soviets applied their doctrine, sometimes regardless of the terrain or situation, and tried to fight the enemy they wanted to fight. While there is a lot of information in the book, most of it applies specifically to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. Take this book for what it is, an AAR of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.

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**General Patton: A Soldier's Life** by Stanley P. Hirshson, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2002, 688 pp., \$34.95.

General George S. Patton Jr., an inspirational leader and outstanding tactician, has intrigued and confounded his biographers for more than a half-century. Now, using untapped archival materials from both the United States and Britain, government documents, family papers, and oral histories, Stanley P. Hirshson, a City University of New York history professor, creates a portrait of Patton that provokes some very mixed reactions to the author's interpretation of well charted territories of knowledge concerning Patton.

Like many reappraisals of controversial figures that typically challenge traditional views through new evidence or by highlighting a

less considered perspective, the author has failed to avoid the passion of any discussion of George S. Patton Jr. He sets the book's tone in the preface by rejecting the work of previous Patton biographers, asserting their research was incomplete and even questionable. Hirshson fails to identify the scholars he claims to challenge.

Hirshson's *Patton* has a longer rap sheet than usual. The book opens with a recount of atrocities committed in Sicily by troops under Patton's 7th Army Command. He blames Patton's fire-eating oratory to his troops for creating a mindset among his men that allegedly facilitated such acts. He traces Patton's childhood, hard-won West Point education, performance in the 1912 Olympics, an influential marriage, affairs, and flirtations, and tireless social climbing — all tilled ground by other military historians.

The heart of the book focuses on the Patton's World War II career and accomplishments, revealing the driving ability behind his greatest triumphs and failures. Patton's popular image as a giant of armored combat, for instance, is tempered by the revelation that he expressed some doubts about tank warfare prior to the battle for France in 1944. There is also plenty of material concerning Patton's turbulent relationships with other allied commanders.

The author contradicts the charge, perpetuated by the 1970 movie starring George C. Scott, that Patton was relieved as 3d Army Commander for politically insensitive remarks about the Soviets. In fact, Hirshson argues Patton's refusal to dismiss former Nazis from government positions in post-war Bavaria culminated in his removal. The incredible implication is that Patton was pro-Nazi. There is little doubt that failure to remove Nazis was a factor in Patton's relief from duty. However, documented evidence also notes that anti-Soviet remarks, as well as Patton's comments to the press that "Nazis were about the same as democrats and republicans," summed up to a combination of reasons for Patton's transfer to 15th Army.

This book is not going to change anyone's mind about General Patton. While many of the arguments the author makes are thought provoking, they often appear to be based on emotional judgment, such as "after he married Beatrice Ayer, daughter of a wealthy patrician family, Patton gradually embraced the Ayer's attitude toward labor, race, and ethnicity." He supports his assumptions drawing on insignificant comments that today appear to be politically incorrect.

The book has some flaws that better editing might have avoided. Gander Airfield is located in New Foundland, not Nova Scotia. Robert L. Thompson was the driver of a two-and-a-half-ton truck not a quarter-ton truck. In addition, it is regrettable that more research was not paid to Patton's accident and subsequent death. The author would have benefited from consulting with Horace "Woody" Woodring, Patton's driver, who is still alive, and Robert L.

Thompson, the driver of the truck who died in June 1994. Woodring's account of the accident has remained essentially unchanged for nearly 60 years. Eyewitness descriptions from two of the four participants in the accident would have produced a more complete understanding of the collision, which caused the death of the ranking American general in the European Command.

This is a well-written and interesting book whose virtues are obscured by its unbalanced summary of Patton's human foibles. However, faults and failings cannot obscure the strengths of the most unique American soldier of this or any other century.

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**The Battle of Alamein: Turning Point, World War II** by John Bierman and Colin Smith, Penguin Putnam Inc., New York, 2002, 478 pp., \$32.95.

Americans date the beginning of World War II as 7 December 1941 when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. That is the official date of the United States' entry into the war, prior instances of American involvement notwithstanding. We sometimes forget that for over 2 years before our "Day of Infamy," Europeans and Asians were waging war against the Axis. This book reminds us that much of that war occurred in the deserts of Libya and Egypt. This book covers those battles, culminating in the Battle of Alamein that the authors call the turning point of the war.

The story of the Afrika Korps, consisting of Germans and Italians, versus the British Eighth Army, consisting of Brits, South Africans, Indians, Australians, and others of the empire, is well presented in a narrative that will hold the reader spellbound from beginning to end. The authors thread together countless stories of individual and unit heroism without losing focus on the political, strategic, and tactical story. They explain how Alamein was the first significant battle in which the Germans were defeated. It was the beginning of a string of battles that would culminate in the fall of Berlin nearly 3 years later. The seamless nature of the text is a testament to the authors' experience and skill as writers and historians. Readers will learn of diverse subjects, such as the true story of *The English Patient*, the spying activities of Egypt's future president Anwar Sadat, and how Bernard Montgomery came to wear his trademark beret. At the same time, they will become fully cognizant of the strategic and tactical issues dealt with in London, Washington, and Berlin.

Personalities come to life on these pages making Churchill, Hitler, Mussolini, Rommel, Alexander, and Montgomery more than historical figures. Here they are real men fighting a real war. The characterizations are accurate and believable. Other than Hitler and Mussolini, all are made of the usual combination of qualities and flaws that can be found in just about anyone. Rommel continues to enjoy his perch atop a pedestal made of tragic myth. In

American military history, only Robert E. Lee compares in his treatment by historians. Only passing references to Rommel's Nazi sympathies may dull the shine of Rommel's reputation. In this book, he is a hero thrust into impossible situations without support of his superiors or hope of success.

Tankers should find the book most interesting since the bulk of the battles were armor affairs. The inspiring stories of Rommel's Panzers going up against Alexander's and Montgomery's Shermans, Grants, Lees, and Matildas will keep the pages turning. If the stories were just about tanks, they would be routine, perhaps even boring. It is the soldiers and their stories that make this a good book. The authors have researched the personal and military lives of countless participants and painted a detailed picture of the desert soldier. Veterans of our recent desert battles are sure to empathize with them. The authors begin the book at a recent soldiers' reunion, describe battles in brilliant detail, and end in the German, Italian, and British cemeteries where those killed now rest. The transitions that take soldiers from being bitter enemies to nostalgic comrades flow smoothly throughout the narrative.

*The Battle of Alamein* is thoroughly enjoyable. Anyone interested in armor or desert warfare, or World War II, should add this book to their reading list.

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**On the German Art of War: Truppenführung**, edited and translated by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, Lynne Reinner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2001, 304 pp., \$57.00.

Historians and professional soldiers have long debated the reasons for German military success during the opening years of World War II. While there are many contending perspectives on this question, few can argue the soundness of German military doctrine used in achieving their early victories; this doctrine was striking in its unique ability to encapsulate the essence of combined arms operations. Bruce Condell and David Zabecki have provided an excellent translation of this groundbreaking doctrinal document in *On the German Art of War: Truppenführung*. This translation, the first to include both the 1933 and 1934 components of the German manual, gives the reader a glimpse into the doctrinal foundations of the German army during World War II.

It is very interesting that modern military professionals can study German concepts written over 6 decades ago and still find many models similar to those still used in the modern U.S. Army. These theories include not only the relatively well-known foundations of offensive and defensive maneuver, but also less prominent themes, such as the different types of smokescreens that units can employ, which

corresponds closely to the current U.S. doctrine on using smoke. Additionally, the manual includes a section on the conduct of fighting in urban areas, a form of combat that few studied seriously prior to World War II. The German authors demonstrate remarkable forethought in emphasizing this key form of combat.

Perhaps even more valuable to the military professional are the essays the German authors include in this work. The "Editors' Introduction" can stand alone as an excellent secondary reference to the value and purpose of *Truppenführung*, both from the historical perspective of 1933 and from the current, 21st-century perspective. In their introductory comments, the editors highlight many of the key elements in this translation, including areas about which German military leaders were most concerned. For instance, Condell and Zabecki stress the fact that German military leaders were not attempting to introduce a system that provided set formulas for success. Instead, the German authors envisioned a structure that would provide "a set of intellectual tools to be applied to complex and ever-unique warfighting situations." The many contributions of this nature, underscored by Condell and Zabecki, demonstrate the full value of *Truppenführung* to modern study.

A second insightful inclusion into this edition is the final "Appendix," consisting of a German review of the 1944 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. The short review, written in 1953 by a panel of former officers, led by Colonel General Franz Halder, does an excellent job of putting the United States' World War II military doctrine in context with that of its German antagonist. Additionally, for those who have a serious interest in the historical development of the United States' post-World War II doctrine, this essay provides a provocative start point for research by emphasizing the similarities of the two approaches — and by implication, the assumption of many German ideas by the Americans based on "unchanging principles of war."

This book will prove greatly beneficial for those studying the development of doctrine from many different angles in the past century. First, the basic tenets laid forth in 1933 paved the way for, in the short term, the way in which the German Wehrmacht fought World War II, or at least the opening years of the war. Second, the manual also set the standard for other militaries and the search for feasible doctrine during the tumultuous years following 1933; many of *Truppenführung's* unproven tenets were vindicated during the war. Third, by having an impact on the development of U.S. Army doctrine at this crucial time, specifically in its impact on writing FM 100-5, the tertiary and subsequent affects can be traced to present debate on U.S. military doctrine. In light of the recent adaptation of FM 3-0, *Operations*, and the accompanying debate, there is much more stimulus to go back and take a look at the *Truppenführung*.

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